

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

AMCONSUL ADANA

AMCONGEN ISTANBUL

AMCONSUL IZMIR

USMISSION USNATO

RUEOIV DIRNSA WASHDC

USNMR SHAPE

CINCUSAFE

CINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 0711

EXDIS

MILITARY ADEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 11)66: XGDS-3 INDEFINITE

TAGS: MARR1 MASS, PFOR, TU

SUBJECT:HFASE NEGOTIATIONS

REF A. STATE 17803, BJM ANKARA 0632 DTG 241126Z JAN 76,

C. ANKARA 0510 DTG 211155Z JAN 76

1. THE NEGOTIATIONS TODAY WITH SECGEN ELEKDAG TOOK A VERY
ADVERSE TURN IN LENGTHY TUESDAY AFTERNOON MEETING (JANUARY 27).

A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF ROUTINE BUSINESS, HOWEVER, WAS TRANSACTED

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BEFORE THIS CAME ABOUT. ELEKDAG CONCEDED TO OUR POSITION ON

FAMILY HOUSING (ARTICLE IV, PARA 3) AND A FEW MINUTES LATER I USED THE ONLY REAL FLEXIBILITY AVAILABLE TO ME IN OUR THREE NEGOTIATING SESSIONS TO DATE TO AGREE TO ACCEPT BRACKETED TURKISH LANGUAGE AND DELETE BRACKETED US LANGUAGE ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING (ARTICLE X). I DID THIS IN PART AS A RECIPROCAL GESTURE TO ELEKDAG'S CONCESSION NOTED ABOVE AND TO MOVEMENT HE HAD EARLIER SHOWN ON OTHER ARTICLES (SUCH AS MANNING, INTERFERENCE, CONSULTATIONS AND LAND USE). BUT THE MAIN REASON WAS THAT IN LAST COUPLE OF MEETINGS ELEKDAG HAS BEEN TINKERING WITH LANGUAGE IN THIS ARTICLE TO COME UP WITH A NEW COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD ELIMINATE A PROVISION FOR THE FUNCTIONAL ASSIGNMENT OF TECHNICAL OPERATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH THE NSA REPRESENTATIVE HERE WISHED RETAINED. BY ACCEPTING THE ORIGINAL TURKISH LANGUAGE CHANGES, I ASSURED RETENTION OF THIS PROVISION. WORDING OF THIS ARTICLE AS AGREED AD REFERENDUM WILL BE PROVIDED SEPTEL. ELEKDAG ALSO TABLED NEW LANGUAGE ON LAND (ARTICLE XIII, PARA 1) WHICH IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER ORIJINAL TURK TEXT BUT STILL GIVES ME SOME CONCERN RE PRIVATE CLAIMS. THIS LANGUAGE IS ALSO BEING REPORTED SEPTEL.

2. I NEXT PRESENTED OUR LANGUAGE FOR ASSISTANCE AND DURATION/TERMINATION ARTICLES AND IN EXPLAINING OUR REASONING DREW AS APPROPRIATE ON EXPLANATORY INFORMATION PROVIDED IN REF A. I ALSO SUGGESTED THAT, BECAUSE OF THE LIBERAL PROVISIONS OF TERMINATION FOR CAUSE WE WERE IMPOSING, THE TURKS REMOVE THE ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH RE LDSPENSION OF OPERATIONS THEY SUGGESTED IN OUR LAST MEETING FOR ARTICLE XXI (REF B).

3. AFTER STUDYING THESE DOCUMENTS, ELEKDAG SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE A FEW PRELIMINARY COMMENTS. HE WAS CONCERNED, HE SAID, BY THE ABSENCE OF LANGUAGE INCLUDED IN THE TURKISH DRAFT (REF C) WHICH STATED THAT THE USG WOULD PROVIDE "AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL" OF ASSISTANCE FOR "THE PURPOSE OF ENABLING THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES TO PERFORM GSM TO MISSIONS ENTRUSTED TO TURKEY AND TO ACQUIRE AND MAINTAIN DEFENSE CAPABILITIES REQUIRED FOR AN ADEQUATE LOCAL CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE NECESSITATED BY TURKEY'S GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION." ELEKDAG SAID THAT TURKISH SIDE ATTACHED SECRET

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GREAT IMPORTANCE TO HAVING LANGUAGE OF THIS KIND IN THIS ARTICLE.

4. NEXT CAME THE VERY ADVERSE DEVELOPMENT MENTIONED IN THE OPENING SENTENCE OF THIS TELEGRAM. ELEKDAG SAID THAT ANOTHER AND MOST SERIOUS CONCERN THE GOT HAD WITH THIS ARTICLE WAS THE 200 MILLION DOLLAR ANNUAL FIGURE. HE SAID HE HAD CONSULTED WITH THE TURKISH CHIEFS OF STAFF AND IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT TURKEY MUST HAVE AN ANNUAL FIGURE OF 700

MILLION DOLLARS, OF WHICH 400 MILLION DOLLARS MUST BE GRANT AND 300 MILLION DOLLARS CREDIT. AFTER WHAT I CAN ONLY DESCRIBE AS AN APPALLED, PROLONGED AND INCREDULOUS SILENCE, I SPENT SOME TIME IN AN EFFORT TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE GOT SIDE COULD POSSIBLY BE SERIOUS IN PRESENTING THIS FIGURE. IT WAS COMPLETELY OUT OF TOUCH WITH REALITY, I SAID, AND I EMPHASIZED THAT IF THE TURKS WERE REALLY SERIOUS ABOUT IT, THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE, IN MY JUDGMENT, NOW DOOMED. IN FACT, I SAID, SIMPLY REPORTING THIS FIGURE WOULD HAVE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES IN WASHINGTON AS IT WOULD RAISE QUESTIONS THERE WHETHER TURKEY WAS SEEKING TO REPLACE A POLICY OF "MUTUALITY" WITH AN EXTRAORDINARILY UNREALISTIC "MAKE-THE-AMERICANS-PAY-THROUGH-THE-NOSE" SUBSTITUTE. ELEKDAG REPEATED THAT THIS FIGURE WAS BASED ON THE TURKISH MILITARY'S NEED OF 10 BILLION LIRA ANNUALLY TO FINANCE AN EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION PROGRAM APART FROM ITS NORMAL OPERATING BUDGET. I SAID THAT THE NEEDS OF ALL MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS PRESENTED MONEY APPETITES WHICH SIMPLY COULD NOT RPT NOT BE MSZ IN ANY COUNTRY. WITHIN THE USG THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF SYMPATHY, I SAID, TO FIND A WAY TO GIVE TURKEY AS MUCH ASSURANCE AS WAS POSSIBLE UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION (AND IN THE FACE OF OUR CURRENT POLITICAL REALITIES) OF A DEPENDABLE FLOW OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. I MADE CRYSTAL CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION WHATSOEVER IN ANY QUARTER OF THE USG OF MORE THAN TRIPLING OUR PAST AID LEVEL. I COULD NOT EXAGGERATE, I REPEATED, THE DAMAGING EFFECT OF TURKEY'S EVEN SUGGESTING IT TO WASHINGTON. I AGAIN EMPHASIZED THAT THE 200 MILLION DOLLAR ANNUAL FIGURE WAS THE MAXIMUM THE ADMINISTRATION COULD OFFER AND I GAVE IT AS MY PERSONAL OPINION THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE A VERY DIFFIIFLT TIME IN SELLING EVEN THAT FIGURE TO THE CONGRESS. ELEKDAG WAS DISCOMFORTED BY THESE REMARKS BUT
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IN RESPONSE SIMPLY SAID THAT THE TURKS HADN'T LIKED OUR 200 MILLION DOLLAR FIGURE EITHER, BUT HADN'T BEEN SO LOQUACIOUS ABOUT IT.

5. ELEKDAG THEN MADE A VERY APPARENT EFFORT TO MOVE AWAY FROM THIS UNPLEASANT SUBJECT AND TO MOVE INTO LESS CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, OUR SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION DID NOTHING TO LIGHTEN THE ATMOSPHERE, AS TWO ADDITIONAL AND UNFORTUNATE NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENTS ENSUED. THE FIRST WAS ELEKDAG'S FOLLOW-UP TO OUR DISCUSSION OF THIRD COUNTRY FLIGHTS IN OUR PREVIOUS MEETING WITH A STATEMENT THAT "SINCE THE GOT HAS POWER ONLY TO
BAKE AN AGREEMENT LIMITED TO NATO OBLIGATIONSV IT CANNOT CONCLUDE AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT WITH THE US ON THIRD COUNTRY FLIGHTS." ALTHOUGH THIS CAN BE CONSIDERED ON A CASE BY CASE

BASIS, HE EXPLAINED, IT CANNOT BE RECORDED AS A CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION.

6. ELEKDAG NEXT SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY HE WOULD HAVE TO REVERSE WHAT HE HAD TENTATIVELY TOLD ME IN THE LAST MEETING REGARDING THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF THE 1954 TAX RELIEF AGREEMENTS. A NEW TAX RELIEF AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED, HE SAID. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT WE HAVE A TAX AGREEMENT BY THE TIME ANY NEW AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED IN WASHINGTON, ELEKDAG OFFERED, AS AN ALTERNATIVE SIMULTANEOUS GOT ASSURANCES THAT ALL TAXES "WOULD BE RECORDED BK NOT REPEAT NOT COLLECTED" UNTIL WE COULD NEGOTIATE AN EX POST FACTO TAX AGREEMENT. I SAID THE US COULD NOT REPEAT NOT INCUR SUCH LIABILITIES WITH NO GUARANTEE THAT THEY WOULD BE ULTIMATELY RESCINDED.

7. SENSING THE AMERICAN DELEGATION'S CONVICTION THAT TODAY'S DEVELOPMENTS JEOPARDIZED THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A TIMELY AGREEMENT, OR ANY AGREEMENT, ELEKDAG TRIED TO END MEETING ON UPBEAT NOTE. HE ARGUED THAT WE COULD STILL FIND A WAY TO GET A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT IN TIME FOR CAGLAYANGIL'S WASHINGTON VISIT AND URGED DAILY SESSIONS FROM NOW ON. I COUNTERED BY SAYING THAT THERE WAS NO CHANCE WHATSOEVER OF GETTING AN AGREEMENT IF TURKEY WAS AT ALL SERIOUS ABOUT THE FIGURE IT HAD PRESENTED. I NEVERTHELESS AGREED TO THE DAILY MEETINGS, AND WE ARE RESUMING OUR DISCUSSIONS AT 1600 TOMORROW (WEDNESDAY, JANUARY RVWILM
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
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O 272035Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2182

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AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONGEN ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR
USMISSION USNATO
DIRNSA WASHDC
USNMR SHAPE
CINCUSAFE
CINCEUR
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ANKARA 0711

EXDIS

MILITARY ADEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (GARBLES THROUGHOUT TEXT)

8. AS OUR MEETING WAS BREAKING UP ELEKDAG AND I WENT OFF FOR A PRIVATE TALK WITH NO OTHERS PRESENT. AFTER COVERING SOME UNRELATED INTELLIGENCE/TERRORIST MATTERS, WE TURNED BACK QUICKLY TO THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE DAY'S MEETING. ELEKDAG WAS NOTICEABLY SHAKEN BY WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED. HE WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE SHOCK EFFECT HIS PRESENTATION HAD INEVITABLY HAD ON THE AMERICAN SIDE AND WAS ANXIOUS TO GIVE ME THE BACKGROUND. HE SAID EARLIER IN THE DAY HE HAD A MEETING WITH GENERAL SANCAR (CHIEF OF TURKISH GENERAL STAFF) AND THAT THE ASSISTANCE
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FIGURE HAD COME FROM THE GENERAL. HE SAID IT WAS INFLUENCED PRIMARILY BY TURKISH MODERNIZATION REQUIREMENTS BUT ALSO BY COMPARISONS WITH WHAT THE U.S. WAS GIVING TO JORDAN AND EGYPT. (I EXPLAINED THAT EGYPT'S TOTAL HAD A LARGE SHARE OF PL 480 IN IT; I SAID I DID NOT KNOW THE DETAILS OF THE JORDANIAN PACKAGE, BUT I EXPLAINED THAT OVER A THIRD OF THE SPANISH TOTAL WAS COMPOSED OF EX-IM BANK CREDITS.) I SAID THAT IF THE TURKISH GENERALS WERE REALLY SERIOUS ABOUT THIS FIGURE, THEY WERE OUT OF TOUCH WITH REALITY. ELEKDAG DID NOT DEMUR. HE SAID HE HAD POINTED OUT THE PROBLEMS THIS FIGURE WOULD CAUSE BUT THAT GENERAL SANCAR HAD REMAINED ADAMANT CONCERNING IT.

9. ELEKDAG REPORTED THAT IN OTHER AREAS HE HAD MORE SUCCESS WITH SANCAR. THE LATTER HAD

SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED, DESPITE LISTENING TO A GROUP OF ARGUMENTS FROM HIS STAFF ("WHICH MADE NO SENSE," SAID ELEKDAG), THAT THE ARTICLE IV LANGUAGE EXCLUDING THE HOUSING AREAS FROM INSTALLATIONS BE DROPPED. ELEKDAG SAID THAT SANCAR HAD ALSO AUTHORIZED A MORE FORTHCOMING POSITION ON THE ANNEXES AND IMPORT-EXPORT ARTICLES (KEY SUBJECTS WHICH HAD NOT COME UP IN OUR MEETING TODAY BECAUSE THEY WERE STILL AT THE ASULA-GARDNER LEVEL. SANCAR HAD DONE THAT AFTER ELEKDAG HAD EXPLAINED THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF TURKISH PROPOSALS. ELEKDAG ADDED THAT NEW, AND HE WAS SURE MORE ACCEPTABLE, TURKISH ARTICLES ON ANNEXES AND IMPORT-EXPORT WOULD BE CONVEYED BY ASULA TO GARDNER TOMORROW.

10. ELEKDAG TOLD ME THAT AS SOON AS HE LEFT HIS MEETING WITH GENERAL SANCAR HE HAD IMMEDIATELY ATTEMPTED TO SEE FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL TO REPORT ON WHAT HAD BEEN SAID RE THE AID LEVEL FIGURE. CAGLAYANGIL HAD HOWEVER, ALREADY LEFT THE OFFICE AND WAS HAVING LUNCH WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AT A RESTAURANT DOWNTOWN. ELEKDAG TELEPHONED CAGLAYANGIL AT THE RESTAURANT TO TELL HIM OF THE MILITARY'S FIGURE AND TO ASK FOR GUIDANCE. CAGLAYANGIL LEFT ELEKDAG ON THE PHONE FOR A LENGTHY PERIOD WHILE HE IN TURN CONFERRED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. WHEN HE CAME BACK TO THE PHONE, HE SIMPLY SAID THE ELEKDAG WOULD HAVE TO PRESENT THE FIGURE THE MILITARY HAD GIVEN HIM.

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11. I STRESSED AGAIN THE DAMAGE THAT EVEN THE REPORTING OF THIS ASSISTANCE FIGURE WOULD DO TO OUR EFFORT, OCSZHEYHS MEIZF, TO GET TO A NEW AND MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT. ELEKDAG SAID THAT IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS TALK WITH THE GENERALS THAT IT IS THE GRANT FIGURE WHICH IS BOTHERING THEM THE MOST, THAT THE \$75 MILLION AND PROGRESSIVELY DOWNWARD ANNUAL FIGURE WAS CONSIDERED BY THEM TO BE COMPLETELY INADEQUATE. I SAID THAT GIVEN THE FADING CHARACTER OF GRANT ASSISTANCE, I HAD BEEN VERY SURPRISED THE US WAS WILLING TO UNDERTAKE THE ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE EVEN THIS MUCH. IN RESPONSE ELEKDAG ACKNOWLEDGED THE DIFFICULTY BUT PLEADED FOR SOME INCREASE IN THE GRANT AND TOTAL. HE ALSO WONDERED WHETHER OUR PACKAGE COULD BE SWEETENED BY SOME EX-IM CREDITS OR THROUGH ANY OTHER DEVICE THAT WE COULD THINK OF. HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF ANY EX-IM CREDITS COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY. I SAID THAT I WOULD EXPLORE THIS EX-IM ANGLE WITH WASHINGTON BUT IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT EX-IM CREDITS WERE NOT REPEAT NOT AVAILABLE FOR ARMS.

12. ELEKDAG AGAIN TRIED TO PUT AS GOOD A FACE ON THE SITUATION AS HE COULD. HE ONCE MORE ARGUED THAT WE COULD STILL MAKE THE MID-FEBRUARY DEADLINE. I REPEATED WE COULD

NOT RPT NOT DO THIS IF THERE WAS ANY SERIOUS TURKISH
MOMENTUM BEHIND THE TURKISH ASSISTANCE FIGURE, AND J
ALSO NOTED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE AN
ESSENTIAL NEW TAX AGREEMENT BETWEEN NOW AND THEN.
WITH RESPECT TO TAX RELIEF AGREEMENT, ELEKDAG SAID
"I CANNOT SAY THIS FORMALLY AT THE TABLE, BUT I WANT YOU
TO KNOW THAT I FULLY AGREE THAT YOU HAVE TO HAVE A
TAX AGREEMENT AT TH TIME THE DEFENSE AGREEMENT IS
SIGNED IN WASHINGTON." HE SAID "SINCE I MET WITH YOU
LAST, I HAVE BEEN OVERULED BY THE FINANCE MINISTRY,
BUT I WILL CONTINUE TO BATTLE WITH THEM AND I HAVE
NOT GIVEN UP HOPE THAT I CAN SWITCH THEM."

13. COMMENT: I DO NOT RPT NOT THINK THE GOT REGARDS
THE \$700 MILLION FIGURE AS REALISTIC BUT THE FACT THAT
IT WOULD BE SERIOUSLY ADVANCED FROM SUCH A HIGH AND
RESPONSIBLE LEVEL (GENERAL SANCAR) IS A MATTER OF
SERIOUS CONCERN. SETTING ASIDE THIS NOTABLY FAULTY
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PERCEPTION OF U.S. TOLERANCES, WHAT WE HAVE HERE IS
THE BEGINNINGS OF A HIGHLY UNREALISTIC "RUGMERCHANTING"
EXERCISB. THE DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL THAT THE TURKS
INITIAL ANNUAL FIGURE WAS \$1.5 BILLION AND WHAT THEY
OBVIOUSLY HAVE IN MIND NOW IS THE NOTABLY UNREALISTIC
HOPE THAT THEY CAN SPLIT THE DIFFERENCE SOMEWHERE
BETWEEN THEIR CURRENT 700 MILLION AND OUR 200 MILLION FIGURES.

14. WHILE THIS IS COMPLETELY UNREALISTIC FROM OUR POINT
OF VIEW, THERE MAY BE SOME SWEETENERS THAT WE CAN
BEGIN TO THINK ABOUT AS ADD-ONS TO OUR FIGURE. IN THIS
CONNECTION I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BEGIN TO THINK ABOUT SUCH
POSSIBLE ADD-ON ITEMS AS (A) A LEVEL OF EX-IM BANK LOANS
AND (B) AGREEING TO REDUCE OUR PRESENCE HERE IN THE COURSE OF
THE EARLY YEARS OF THE AGREEMENT. I AM NOT SURE THAT
ANY DEVICE OF THIS KIND CAN BRIDGE THE CHASM THAT
EXISTS BETWEEN OUR TWO ASSISTANCE FIGURES, BUT I THINK
THESE ARE TWO APPROACHES WE SHOULD EXPLORE.

15. IT IS CLEAR FROM MY CONVERSATION THAT ELEKDAG
IS MOST ANXIOUS TO GET EVERYTHING BUT THE ASSISTANCE FIGURE RE-
SOLVED BETWEEN US BEFORE THE FEBRUARY 11-12-13 VISIT.
WHILE I AM SURE WASHINGTON'S DISMAY OVER THE \$700 MILLION
FIGURE WILL BE NO LESS THAN MINE, I URGE THAT I
BE GIVEN QUID-PRO-QUO LANGUAGE AUTHORIZATION
THAT WILL PERMIT MY EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION WITH ELEKDAG
IN THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL.
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